Beyond the embryo : providing greater recognition for the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand constitution by Dibley, Thomas.
THOMAS H. DIBLEY 
BEYOND THE EMBRYO: PROVIDING GREATER 
RECOGNITION FOR THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI IN THE NEW ZEALAND 
CONSTITUTION 
LLB(HONS) RESEARCH PAPER 
PUBLIC LAW (LAWS 505) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2001 
CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT 3 
I INTRODUCTION 4 
II GOALS FOR A FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE 
TREATY 5 
A Legitimacy 6 
B Recognition 7 
C Frameworks 7 
D International compliance 8 
E National Identity 9 
F M ultic ulturalism!Bi-culturalis m 9 
III THE CURRENT PIACE OF THE TREATY 10 
A The Legislature 11 
B The Judiciary 17 
C Conclusion 20 
IV HOW SHOULD THE TREATY OF WA/TANG! BE 
INTERPRETED? 21 
A Literal Approach 21 
B Principled Approach 22 
V METHODS OF GIVING TREATY FORMAL RECOGNITION 26 
A New Deal 26 
B Tangible 28 
1 A Maori Parliament 28 
2 A settlement process 29 
C Abstract 33 
1 Principles of Crown constitutional government 35 
2 Maori principles of governance 42 
VI ENTRENCHMENT OF THE TREATY 46 
VII THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 50 
XIII CONCLUSION 53 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
LIBRARY 
APPENDIX I THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE TREATY 54 
APPENDIX II AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE 
MAORI VERSION OF THE TREATY 55 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56 
2 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
This essay looks at the constitutional place that the Treaty of Waitangi 
holds in New Zealand today and suggests that alternative positioning of 
the Treaty in New Zealand 's constitutional fabric is required. The essay 
suggest that such a change is necessary to provide the Treaty relationship, 
and the principles that such a relationship enshrines, greater emphasis so 
that the promise and spirit of the Treaty that was originally bargained 
upon back in 1840 can be fulfilled. 
The conclusion that the essay will offer is that the Treaty, or at least 
principles that can be garnered from it, should be constitutionalised in 
New Zealand law. Constitutionalisation will require the Treaty to be 
provided for in a way that necessitates legislation, policy and precedent to 
adhere to its principles. The essay further concludes that such a move is 
necessary in order to provide a framework for a way forward for New 
Zealand as a nation, but, at the moment the national environment is not 
conducive to this so constitutional change of this magnitude seems 
unlike! y to occur. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 13,500 words. 
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"The Treaty has to be seen as an embryo rather than a fully developed 
and integrated set of ideas." 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
4 
This paper is designed to explore the issues surrounding a formal recognition of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty) in New Zealand law. The essay puts forward a 
framework for a general, informed, constitutional debate on the issue of a formal 
place for the Treaty in New Zealand"s constitutional makeup and looks towards 
some possible outcomes that would provide the Treaty relationship a greater 
emphasis. The essay will address the issue of what system would incorporate and 
give effect to the values and aspirations of both Maori and Pakeha as Treaty 
partners2 and whether this system would need to be entrenched to properly provide 
for the Treaty. 
The conclusion that will be offered is that for the goals as set out in the essay to be 
achieved, and for the Treaty relationship to move beyond the embryo stage, a formal 
legal place for the Treaty needs to be found. The essay further concludes that a 
logical place for the Treaty is a constitutional one in which consistency in further 
relationships can be based. The essay suggests that the best way for all of the parties 
to consistently interpret the Treaty relationship in the modern world is to place it in a 
constitutional framework so that all decisions, legislation and policy will be 
produced in accordance with a consistent legal meaning of the Treaty. 
1 Nell' Zealand Maori Council v Attome_,·-Ceneral [ 1987] I NZLR 641. 663 per Cooke P [NZMC v 
AC]. 
2 New Zealand Law Society Seminar Treaty of Waitangi Issues - Th e Last Decade and the Next 
Century April 1997, 12 ["NZLS Seminar"]. 
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II GOALS FOR A FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE TREATY 
If change is to occur in the provision for the Treaty relationship then it needs to be 
precipitated by national consultation with all groups in order to be considered 
legitimate. "We should draw on the extensive experience of individuals, families, 
tribes and many other groups organising themselves within a state or indeed across 
several states. "3 
In assessing goals for a future recognition of the Treaty relationship the essay looks 
at only those goals that all parties to the process are likely to agree upon. 
Unfortunately, it must be noted that the political realities are likely to be much 
different, with polarised positions on what the Treaty was entered into to achieve 
and what any constitutional recognition of it should seek to achieve in the future . ..i 
The goals that are set out in this section for formal recognition of the Treaty 
relationship · have necessarily been left broad, without suggesting an end in 
themselves in order to enhance the possibility of agreement. The identified goals 
don ' t suggest concrete outcomes such as a full settlement or development of a Maori 
Parliament. Nor do they suggest other more abstract outcomes, such as a formal 
constitutional provision. 
While most groups and individuals involved in developing Treaty jurisprudence and 
policy have differing views on what the goals should be in furthering the Treaty 
relationship, and hence the direction that should be taken on any constitutional 
issues, some common themes emerge, and are discussed below. 
3 Hon Kenneth Keith "The Tribunal. the Courts and the Legislature·· in G. McLay (ed) Trear_r 
Settlements: The Unfinished Business (New Zealand Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Wellington . 
1995) 39. 46 ["Tribunal. Courts and Legislature"]. 
4 Paul Perry and Alan Webster New Zealand Politics ai the Turn of the Millennium: Altitudes and 
Values about Politics and Gm•ernment (A lpha Publica ti ons. Auckland, 1999) 74. 
6 
A Legitimacy 
The Treaty has to be seen as a key source of the New Zealand government's moral 
and political claim to legitimacy in governing the country.
5 For the Crown to be 
morally and politically legitimate, in any sort of outcome on the Treaty, rights it 
agreed that Maori were to continue to hold under the Treaty need to be formally 
recognised. 
Many argue that a formal place for the Treaty is necessary to establish constitutional 
frameworks that recognise the equally legitimate sovereign rights of Maori and the 
Crown to exercise government.
6 This, in turn, would be seen to increase the Crown's 
legitimacy, as Maori sovereignty was ceded on terms and conditions that have not 
been fulfilled and recognition of Maori rights would be seen as an attempt to redress 
these issues. 
Concentrating on the enhancement of the legitimacy of the Crown does provide a 
possible stumbling block in that the Crown itself is the symbol of illegitimacy and 
colonial rule and that symbolism may be unacceptable for many to formally 
recognise. At a hui held at Hirangi Marae participants discounted the possibility of a 
durable Treaty process without a final break with colonial laws and processes. 
7 What 
is better looked at is how to further enhance the legitimacy of the "governance" of 
New Zealand. Formalising the Treaty would necessitate a redefinition of the place of 
the "Crown" in New Zealand's constitutional framework. 
This is a reality that permeates through all of the goals of the formal recognition of 
the Treaty - the Crown, as it was at the time of the signing of the Treaty and is now 
5 G Palmer & M Palmer Bridled Poll'er: New Zealand Goi,emme11t Under MMP (Oxford University 
Press. New Zealand. 1997) 287 ["Bridled Poll'er"J. 
6 Moana Jackson ''Where Does Sovereignty Lie?"' in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington. 2000) 197. 
7 M.H. Durie ·'Proceedings of a Hui held at Hirangi Marae. Turangi. 29 January 1995'' in G. McLay 
(ed) Treaty Settlemems: The Unfinished Business (New Zealand Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. 
Wellington. 1995) 19, 26 ["Proceedings of a hui .. ]. 
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1s radically different and would need a modern redefinition rn order to enhance 
legitimacy and reflect the values of New Zealanders. 8 
B Recognition 
Formal recognition of the Treaty as our founding document would hardly suffice if 
the underlying message about the constitutional status of Maori were not provided 
for. 9 This recognition would need to be in context. Maori were, and are, New 
Zealand's first nation but recognition given to that status in 1840 was not designed 
to be, and is not amenable to the present day. One of the goals would need to be a 
contextual redefinition and re-recognition of the constitutional role of Maori. This 
contextual redefinition could only be achieved through consultation with a wide 
range of representatives of the Maori people. This discussion would need to center 
around the definition and protection of the rights of the Maori people today and the 
recognition of their constitutional position under the Treaty. 10 
C Frameworks 
A clear framework for the future relationship between the Treaty partners, including 
the recognition of intangible grievances such as lack of Maori self-determination, is 
seen by many as a necessary goal. 11 Denise Henare has written that "it is not enough 
to advocate generosity of spirit: structures and systems are also needed." 12 The lack 
of frameworks has also been seen as hampering the process of Crown settlement 
with Maori as the proposals for the settlement of Treaty grievance claims have 
suffered from the absence of an overriding clear framework based on the Treaty. 13 
8 Richard Mulgan Maori, Pakeha and Democracy (Oxford Univer ity Press. Auckland. 1989) 8 
["Maori, Pakeha and Democracr"J. 
9 Hon Edward Durie. ·The Treaty in the Constitution .. in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitu1io11 
(Institute of Policy Studies. Wellington. 2000) 20 I [''The Treaty in the Constitution"]. 
'
0 Report or the Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy 
(Government Printer, Wellington. 1986) p 112 - recommendation 7 / ''Royal Commission"]. 
11 Catherine Callaghan ·'Constitutionalisation of Treaties by the Courts·· ( 1999) 18 NZULR 334. 335. 
12 Denise Henare ··can or Should the Treaty be RepealledT in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constilution (Institute of Policy Studies. Wellington. 2000) 207. 209. 
13 Proceedings ofa hui. above n7. 26. 
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D International compliance 
Assimilation with international law principles, especially the draft United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993, would need to be a goal of 
formal recognition of the Treaty. International political reality necessitates this, as 
the sovereignty of individual nations is increasingly being eroded as a concept by the 
globalisation of political standards. 1 .. This does not mean that any possible 
agreement on the Treaty relationship should be unduly constrained by international 
agreements, merely that it is a useful guide that should not be deviated from if 
possible. 
E National Identity 
Some, such as Richard Boast, have argued that the Treaty has proved too slender a 
foundation on which to construct a new mythic sense of national identity. 15 While, 
through the current methods of interpretation, the Treaty has failed to provide a basis 
for "one-nationhood", if formal recognition of the Treaty is to be promoted one of 
the goals that any manifestation that formal Treaty recognition takes would need to 
be its ability to promote a sense of national identity. 
Perhaps this notion of a symbolic position for the Treaty that acknowledges our 
national identity is what Matthew Palmer was talking about when discussing 
legislative recognition of the Treaty, arguing that "If your purpose in referring to the 
Treaty in legislation is to enhance its symbolic value, then strictly speaking you have 
no need to give it a particular legal effect." 16 Palmer does not discount symbolism as 
important, citing it as a cornerstone of constitutional arrangements, 17 but proposes 
that legal effect should be given instead to specific legislative provisions. 
14 Tribunal, Courts and Legislature. above n3 . 47. 
15 Richard Boast "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Law" ( 1999) NZLJ 123. 
16 Matthew Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi in Legislation'· (200 I) NZLJ. 207. 
17 Palmer. above n 16. 209. 
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Palmer's argument is confined to individual pieces of legislation rather than 
something that gives the Treaty an overall formal place. 18 If this approach is to be 
adopted toward the vehicle which carries formal recognition of the Treaty, then care 
will need to be taken in separating what is the symbolic and hence of no legal effect 
and what is the instrumental to be given legal effect. This separation would not 
necessarily be easy as the Treaty is itself a document symbolic of the relationship 
between the Crown and Maori, and this symbolism will need to be represented and 
may need to be given legal effect in any formal recognition of the Treaty 
relationship. 
F Multiculturalism/Bi-culturalism 
There is general objection among Maori to being considered one among many 
minorities in a multicultural society.19 The argument is that terming New Zealand a 
multicultural society has the effect of downgrading the unique importance of the 
Maori people; they become just one more ethnic minority alongside all the others, 
each with their own culture. 10 This argument would see New Zealand as more of a 
bicul tural society. 
The need for recognition of New Zealand as a multicultural society comes back to 
the need to redefine the Crown. and to ask the question who the modern successor to 
the Crown is~ 1 Other minority groups will come under the auspices of the modern 
New Zealand definition of "Crown." Maori were an indigenous, sovereign signatory 
to the Treaty and as such, while a minority group in numbers, have a status equal to 
that of the Crown. Other minority groups' points of view, on the other hand, will 
18 Palmer, above n 16. 209 where Palmer talks about possible symbolic placement of the Treaty in the 
Constitution Act 1986. 
19 D.V. Williams "The Constitutional Status of the Treaty of Waitangi: An Historical Perspective .. 
(1990/91) 14 NZULR 9. 16. 
20 Maori, Pakeha and Democracr. above n8. 8. 
21 Alex Frame "A State Servant Looks at the Treaty'' ( 1990/91) 14 NZULR 82. 91. 
need to be considered under the notion of "Crown" when formulating any formal 
place for future Treaty relationships. 
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New Zealand is now both a bicultural and a multicultural society. Multicultural 
aspects will come under the modern definition of the Crown; Bi-culturalism is the 
notion that a nation should accommodate two peoples each with its own culture and 
in this context will be the sharing of power between the Crown and Maori. 22 Both 
the bicultural and the multicultural will need to be recognised when finding a formal 
place for the Treaty. 
III THE CURRENT PLACE OF THE TREATY 
To say that the Treaty is a matter of national importance and will likely be so for a 
Jong time to· come is to state the obvious. Literature of all kinds, and from all 
viewpoints has traced the historical origins of the document and the relationship 
between the native Maori people and the settler population that it enshrined. Given 
the status of the Treaty it therefore seems strange that the methods used to deal with 
the Treaty by the legislature and the judiciary have been inconsistent in approach 
and effect. The problems with the current methods of interpretation and 
implementation of the Treaty and its principles need to be assessed to see whether 
they are providing, or could provide, a consistent framework for the Treaty 
relationship. 
The Treaty is a document that has conflicting literal meanings and an unsure place in 
New Zealand constitutional fabric. These problems have meant that two main issues 
have faced anyone considering a place for the Treaty: 
22 Maori. Pakeha and Democracy. above n8. 8. 
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First, finding an acceptable interpretation of the Treaty out of the conflicting literal 
meanings of the English and Maori versions of the document. 
Second, finding a place for the Treaty that provides the meaning garnered from the 
document with a formal place in New Zealand's constitutional fabric that i 
acceptable to all concerned. This has often meant that the issue of a constitutional 
place for the Treaty has not been debated much beyond the embryo stage that Lord 
Cooke suggested, and any proposals for change have been met with skepticism and 
ultimately rejected. 23 
Compounding the problems with interpreting and categorising the Treaty, 1s the 
inconsistent way in which the Treaty is included in legislation and in which 
legislative references to the Treaty are interpreted by the Courts. 
A The Legislature 
The substantive incorporation of the Treaty into New Zealand law came with the 
passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 which provided for the establishment of 
the Waitangi Tribunal?+ This did not mean that the legislature had newfound 
enthusiasm for Treaty issues - reference to the Treaty itself or to tikanga Maori was 
virtually non-existent in pre-1984 legislation?' Since that date many other Acts have 
attempted to deal with how the Treaty applies to their legislation 26 and it is mainly 
through legislative means that the Treaty is now recognised in domestic law. 
However, legislative provision for the Treaty has been ad hoe, inconsistent and, at 
23 The example of the Treaty clause in the proposed Bill of Rights is discussed bellow in Part VII. 
2
~ Section 5 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 provides for there to be Waitangi Tribunal. Section 6 
of the Act provides for the Tribunal" s jurisdiction. 
25 Paul Havemann "'What's in the Treaty?': Constitutionalizing Maori Rights in Aotearoa New 
Zealand 1975 - 1993" in Kayleen Hazlehurst (ed) Legal Pluralism and the Colonial Legacy (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd. Aldershot) 73. 89. [ '· What 's in the Treaty " ]. 
26 Some legislation was specif'ically enacted to secure rights protected by the Treaty. examples 
include the Maori Language Act 1987 which implemented the Waitangi Tribunal Te Rea Maori 
Report (Wai 11 ). the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 which in part implemented the Waitangi Tribunal 
Muri11-/1e11ua Fishing Report - Wai 22 (Department of Justice. Wellington. 1988)- cc also 
Havemann.aboven25,94. 
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least until the 1986 New Zealand Maori Council case, the exact meaning that the 
legislative references conveyed were never really known. 
In 1986 Cabinet gave a general direction on Treaty issues. Cabinet:~7 
l. agreed that all future legislation referred to cabinet at the policy approval stage 
should draw attention to any implications for recognition of the principles of the 
Treaty 
2. agreed that departments should consult with appropriate Maori people on all the 
significant matters affecting the application of the Treaty. the Minister of Maori 
Affairs to provide assistance in identifying such people if necessary; and 
3. noted that the financial and resource implications of recognising the Treaty could 
be considerable and should be assessed wherever possible in future reports. 
Despite this agreed consistency in the process of including the Treaty in legislation, 
the legislature ·has not been altogether consistent in the development of statutory 
provision for this policy. Sir Kenneth Keith categorised the different types of 
legislative references to the Treaty , concluding~8 
l. Some statutes, we must take it by deliberate Ministerial and Parliamentary 
decision, make no reference at all to the Treaty when one could have been 
expected (recent health statutes provide instances). 
2. Others require those exercising powers to have regard for the Treaty along with 
other matters and purposes (the resource management legislation is an instance); 
while 
3. Others , such as the Conservation and State Owned Enterprises Acts, go further 
and require compliance with the principles of the Treaty. 
~
7 Legislation Advisory Council "Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content ( 1991) 40. 
2 Tribunal. Courts and Legislature. above n3 . 42. 
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Keith goes on to state that there are other Acts which state that their terms are based 
on the principles of the Treat/9 and others refer to specific Maori interests rather 
than the Treaty or its principles>'0 
Specific examples of inconsistent provision made for the Treaty include: 31 
"This Act shall be so interpreted and administered as to give effect to the principles 
of the Treaty of W aitangi "32 
" ... The shareholding Minister shall have regard to the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi"33 
"It is the duty of the Council of an institution in the performance of its function and 
the exercise of its powers (b) to acknowledge the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi"34 
Statutory interpretation would dictate that these sections would have different 
meanings and different levels of force and protection given to the Treaty of Waitangi 
and Maori interests. 35 
It would seem from this analysis that it would be beneficial for interpretation of 
legislation and the development of the Treaty relationship for there to be consistent 
methods of including Treaty references in legislation. The wide-ranging and 
inconsistent references to the Treaty allows Treaty interests to play a large part in 
some areas and an inconsistently smaller one in other (equally important) areas. 
Providing consistency of application of Treaty principles across all legislation would 
29 Keith here refers generally to Fisheries and Forestry legislation. 
30 Maori Language Act 1987. 
31 Palmer, above n 16. 208. 
32 Section 4 Conservation Act 1987. 
33 Section I O Crown Research Institutes Act 1992. 
3
~ Section 181 Education Act 1989. 
3
~ Palmer, above n 16, 208. 
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go far toward addressing these problems, and also help to make the Treaty clauses 
less stagnant in time so they become living and adaptable to future occurrences. 
Inconsistency 10 legislative prov1s1on may not necessarily be a negative thing. 
Flexibility in legislative provision is necessary to fully deal with the Treaty 
relationship and the wording of provisions will necessarily be diverse. The way in 
which the Treaty relationship needs to be fostered in regard to commercial matters 
differs vastly from how the Treaty needs to be provided for in environmental matters 
and this needs to be reflected in the legislation. 
Others believe that the current system could provide for a constructive and 
consistent way forward if changes in referencing the Treaty in legislation are made. 
Palmer has suggested that a generic, symbolic reference to the Treaty without 
legislative effect, coupled with specific legislative provisions which are legally 
enforceable, would be a useful direction for future Treaty relationships. 36 
These arguments would be much stronger if it were just the Treaty Clauses 
themselves that were inconsistent and diverse. The reality is that the policy and 
principle that underlies their development and intended application of Treaty 
references is also inconsistent. 
In July 1989 the Labour government set down five principles in respect to the 
determination of Treaty issues: these were issued in the form of a policy statement37 
Principle I: The Principle of Government, The Kawanatanga Principle 
The Government has the right to govern and make laws 
Principle 2: The principle of self management, the Rangatiratanga Principle 
36 Palmer. above n 16. 212. 
37 Department of Justice Principles for Crown acrion on the Treaty of Waitangi ( 1989) [' 'Principles 
for Crown action"}. 
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lwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their 
resources as their own. 
Principle 3: The principle of equali(r 
All New Zealanders are equal before the law. 
Principle 4: The principle of reasonable co-operation 
Both the Government and Iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable co-
operation on major issues of common concern. 
Principle 5: The principle of redress 
The government is responsible for providing effective process for the 
resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur. 
After the 1990 election, the new National government redrafted the principles to 
accommodate· new policies. The kawanatanga principle was amended to include that 
the government ought to govern for the common good, and the principle of 
rangatiratanga was extended to reflect self-management within the scope of the 
law. 38 
This indicates that governments are not afraid to change what the principles of the 
Treaty are when it suits their purpose. This is another flaw in the current method of 
provision for the Treaty - it is not out of the hands of people who can alter it 
arbitrarily. A genuinely bi-cultural partnership ought surely to entail that important 
decisions concerning the Treaty are within the jurisdiction of a body that is in itself 
bi-cultural in process.39 
The development of the underlying policies and principles is a political one. 
Different governments and political parties are entitled to have a different 
38 Jane Kelsey Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Bridget 
Williams Books. Wellington. 1993) 257 - 258 . 
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interpretation of the Treaty relationship and have thi s reflected in the policies that 
they develop and the legislation that they enact. Under the coalition governments 
that the environment the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system tends to 
deliver,40 negotiation between parties is necessary to form governments and enact 
legislation. In the Treaty context this may mean that hybrid Treaty policies are 
developed and inconsistency in the principles of the Treaty relationship will be 
likely even within governments. 
One commentator has said that recognition and consultation with Maori has gone 
beyond mere Cabinet and governmental direction to find a more solid place in New 
Zealand 's constitutional fabric, stating "The reality may be that Parliament can 
legislate as it pleases and the practice of not legislating without Maori consent may 
be described in Diceyan terms as a constitutional convention. However, the political 
reality is that this convention has become formalised beyond the unwritten 
gentleman's understanding of Dicey's description. ""' 1 Under this analysis, the 
constitutionar position of Maori and the Treaty relationship are safeguarded through 
the consultative processes in place. 
This constitutional convention is realJy only protective and fostering of the Treaty 
relationship when the parties are in agreement. However, "Maori and the State are 
sometimes poles apart, sometimes more or less in agreement, and at times uncertain 
about their respective roles, obligations and mutual expectations.""'1 This means that 
in times of disagreement, the decision on how to proceed falls only on one of the 
parties, and that action will be determined by the shifting sands of political 
d
. -+1 expe 1ency · 
39 Williams. above. n 19. 34. 
40 The two elections to date under the MMP system ( 1996 and 1999) have both provided coalition 
governments. 
41 P Mc Hugh "Sovereignty this Century - Maori and the Common Law Constitution" (2000) 31 
VUWLR 187, 205 [''Sovereignty this Centuary"J. 
42 M.H. Durie Te Mana . Te Ka1ra11atanga: The Politics of Maori Self-De1er111inatio11 (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland. 1998) I {"Te Mana" J. 
43 Williams. above n 19. 32. 
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It seems that legislative provision for the Treaty as it stands now does not and could 
not provide for the constitutional way forward envisaged in this essay. Both the 
policy and the principles that go toward the development of the Treaty clauses in 
legislation and the Treaty clauses themselves are inconsistent and subject to changes 
based not on the agreement of the parties to the Treaty but on the political whim of 
one of the state, with or without consultation with the Maori treaty partner. 
While it may be true that the present situation does provide, at some level, for the 
interests of Maori and the Treaty relationship, the thesis of this essay is that there are 
alternative methods that would provide the relationship between Maori and the 
Crown with constitutional safeguards and a position more likely to flourish the 
Treaty relationship. As seen above, the current method of dealing with Treaty 
relationships and principles is subject to change on political whim. The Treaty 
relationship is not appropriately provided for while a constitutional position is 
allowed to continue where the views of one of the parties can be ignored and shut 
out of the real decision making process. 
B The Judiciary 
Inconsistency in 1egislati ve provision for the Treaty has led to inconsistent 
interpretation of its position in the judiciary. Inconsistent legislation has necessitated 
the Court having to identify for themselves what the principles of the Treaty are and 
then determine what level of protection is being afforded to them under the wording 
of each different legislative clause. 
Added to the problem of inconsistent signals from the legislature, the Court has also 
had to grapple with the problem of a common law place for the Treaty. 
Jurisprudence surrounding the Treaty has shifted ground dramatically over the last 
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150 years, from the Treaty considered as "a simple nullity"44 to having no place in 
municipal law,45 to becoming a fundamental constitutional foundation. 46 
Uncertainty on the applicability of the Treaty by the judiciary does not by itself 
render the current situation unable to provide for the Treaty relationship. It is the 
nature of the law to be uncertain. Fundamental changes in other areas of common 
law have occurred much more rapidly than this. 47 However, as already discussed, the 
Treaty comes for interpretation in the Courts only through legislative provision. 
Therefore, under the current constitutional system, it is not the domain of common 
law and judicially developed policy, as the Courts have to interpret the legislation 
that Parliament enacts. 
The Courts have been quick to state their constitutional place in the Treaty process 
stating that the Treaty will only come to them for analysis and interpretation when 
the legislature has incorporated it into the statute.48 The Courts have also routinely 
dismissed the· Treaty and its provisions as non-justiciable in the absence of specific 
I · ] · c 49 eg1s at1ve re1erence. 
However, the judiciary is stretching their constitutional boundaries in attempting to 
provide for the Treaty. Specific examples include; 
1. Instances where the Courts have felt that, because of the informal constitutional 
importance of the Treaty, it can be used as an interpretative tool even in the 
b f I . 1 . f so a sence o eg1s at1ve re erence. · 
2. The Court of Appeal saw the reference to the Treaty in the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 as a sufficient basis for the Court to stop executive action. 
-1-1 Wi Parara 1• Bishop of Wellington ( 1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 78 per Prendergast CJ. 
-1
5 Hoani Te Heuheu T11kina 1• Aotea District Maori Land Board [ 19..i I] AC 308. 
-1
6 NZMC 1• AG, above n I. 
-1
7 An example is the law of torts which had its start with Donaghue i- Ste1•e11son [ 1932] AC 562. 
48 NZMC 1• AG, above n I. 655 per Cooke P. 
-1
9 Two of the most recent cases are Manukau 1· Attorney-Genera/ ( 19 July 2000) unreported. High 
Court. Auckland Registry. M259-SD00. Chambers J. and Te Kaiha11 1• New Zealand Police ( 11 May 
2000) unreported, High Court Palmerston North Registry. AP5/2000. Durie J. 
50 Palmer. above n 16. 207. 
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3. The Courts have even gone beyond this, stating that customary usage takes 
precedence over other laws. 51 
Most of the cases regarding the Treaty are taken under the head of judicial review. 
But in the words of one commentator "The cases established a common law ground 
of "constitutional" (as opposed to judicial) review."52 Under the constitutional 
system of government in New Zealand as it stands now, Courts should be 
constrained to their usual function of interpreting parliament's expressed intention 
rather than effectively legislating themselves with little to rely on regarding 
controversial policy issues. 53 
The question then begs why it is necessary for the judiciary to extend their 
constitutional boundaries when it comes to providing for the Treaty? The Legislature 
continues to provide inconsistent and vague legislative references to the Treaty and 
leave the interpretation of the principles of the Treaty to the Courts. 54 Palmer has 
argued that the Treaty itself is not sensibly susceptible to ordinary techniques of 
statutory interpretation as the Treaty is a document of constitutional importance, and 
inconsistent legislative references as well as the Treaty itself do not yield black and 
white answers from straight textual analysis. 55 Thus the Courts have had to strive to 
provide for this. 
Palmer argues that a successful way forward could be achieved under the current 
arrangements if Treaty principles are left to the elected representatives and legal 
force is only given to specific provisions rather than the symbolic value given to the 
Treaty in much legislation. 56 This would leave the Courts in a position where they 
51 Te Wehi ,, Regional Fisheries Officer [ 19861 I NZLR 680. 
51 P Joseph "'Constitutional Review Now·· [ 19981 NZ Law Review 85. 
5
' Palmer. above n 16. 212. 
5
~ Section 5(2) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 gives the Waitangi Tribunal the authority to 
"determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied in the two text s and to decide issues 
raised by the differences between them." 
55 Palmer. above n 16. 208 - 209. 
56 Palmer. above n 16. 
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would not need to stretch beyond their constitutional position in providing for the 
Treaty. 
This is a fair point and would go far towards the goal of tidying up legislative 
references to the Treaty, and returning the Courts to within a position that they 
should fill in the constitutional makeup of the Country. However, splitting the legal 
and symbolic would only be productive in provisions from now on. Such a move 
would not provide for consistent interpretation of treaty provisions that have 
previously been enacted. There is, in turn, a real danger that the principles and 
precedent developed by the judiciary in situations where it could be described as 
having stepped beyond its constitutional bounds would influence decisions on the 
specific legislative provisions that Parliament has enacted. 
C Conclusion 
The combination of an unsure legislature and judiciary as to the place the Treaty 
occupies has meant those decisions, policy and legislation concerning the Treaty is 
inconsistent. The context and interpretation of the Treaty is currently the realm of 
lawyers and judges. The legislature not only consistently refers to the abstract 
concept of the principles of the Treaty in legislation, but also has specifically 
enacted legislation making the interpretation and formulation of such principles the 
domain of the Courts. This does not and cannot provide a consistent way forward in 
the future of Treaty relationships 
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IV HOW SHOULD THE TREATY OF WA/TANG/ BE INTERPRETED? 
This Part analyses some of the approaches that could be taken in interpreting the 
Treaty to best provide for the future of Treaty relationships. The answer to this 
question and the one posed in the next section on methods of giving the Treaty 
formal recognition are best left for discussion at a political level between all 
interested parties in the Treaty relationship. What this essay does is provide an 
analysis and guidance on where the future Treaty relationship may best be served. 
A Literal Approach 
The approach of the Treaty literalist compared with a principled approach is that 
Treaty "principles" and "spirit", conveniently overlooks the fact that the Treaty is a 
written document (both in English and Maori)''57 
A difficulty" with this interpretation has been identified by Lord Cooke: "The 
meaning of the text as a whole, and the meanings in the context of individual phrases 
in it, are far from self evident."58 
The question as framed in this essay is whether the literal method of Treaty 
interpretation is the one best adopted when looking to interpret the Treaty bearing in 
mind the goals in Part II of this essay. Addressing the goals suggested by this essay 
would seem to necessitate some reassessment of the Treaty. If a literal interpretation 
is adopted, this would require at least finding a common literal interpretation of 
documents which are on their face irreconcilable. Leaving the two versions of the 
Treaty as they are in legislative form as suggested would throw the question of their 
meaning and interpretation back to the Courts who will be likely to (if not feel 
bound to) follow current precedent of looking beyond the literal word to the Treaty 
principles. 
57 G Chapman 'The Treaty of Waitangi - Fertile Ground for Judicial (and Academic) Mythmaking .. 
[ 1991] NZLJ 228. 232 emphasis in the original. 
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Another possible framework for eliciting the meaning of the Treaty is to use the 
literal version(s) of the Treaty and apply the principles of contract law to its 
prov1s1ons. 
Difficulties anse when addressing the most basic of contractual principles. For 
contract law to apply at all there would need to be a contract between the Crown and 
Maori. This would need to assume that there was an offer by the Crown in the form 
of the Treaty and an acceptance by Maori of the agreement. Analysis of this delves 
into the unclear waters of New Zealand history and this essay is not an apt forum to 
debate what exactly the Crown was offering and Maori were accepting. What is 
clear, however, is that not all Maori were signatories or even in agreement to the 
terms of the Treaty. Those Maori who were signatories to the Treaty were signing a 
document in Maori that was different on its fundamental terms to that signed in 
English. The Ministry of Maori Development has provided and English 
interpretation of the Maori version of the Treaty and the differences between the 
wording and the meaning of the two texts is obvious. 59 
A single Treaty designed to incorporate the goals mentioned above and to be 
interpreted in a literal way or on contractual principles would also seem to be close 
to a renegotiation or a new agreement which is discussed and rejected in Part V of 
this essay. 
B Principled Approach 
The Treaty is already somewhat recognised as the document that constituted ew 
Zealand, thus it has taken on constitutional status: '·It is to be presumed that both 
statutory construction and common law development will occur in conformity with 
its principles."60 The Treaty is part of the set of basic principles that direct how we 
58 Hon R Cooke "Introduction .. ( 1990/91) 14 NZULR I. 3. 
-9 
) Sec Appendix 1 and II . 
60 NZMC ,, AC. above n I . 656 per Cooke P. 
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are governed. Both the Courts61 and Government62 have accepted that a principled 
approach to the Treaty should be adopted. 
The emphasis behind the present approach toward the Treaty has been summed up 
by Lord Cooke when he said: "The Courts and the Tribunal alike, and Parliament 
itself in deciding to refer to the principles, have places in the forefront the need to 
get at the spirit and underlying ideas of the Treaty, to apply them as realistically and 
reasonably as possible in current circumstances."63 
Although some have argued that the idea of a Treaty "spirit" or a collection of 
Treaty principles is a myth,64 or based upon flawed reasoning,65 the Courts66 have 
found that the Treaty must be viewed as a living document, capable of adapting to 
new and changing circumstances,67 with importance lying with the spirit and 
principles of the Treaty above the literal interpretation of the document. 68 
Many commentators disagree with the idea of principles, and their formation by the 
Court. Some, such as Jane Kelsey, have argued that the principles of the Treaty have 
been written so as to deny tino rangatiratanga (guaranteed to Maori under Article II 
of the Treaty of Waitangi) and have consequently "legitimised and entrenched 
Pakeha political power."69 Other writers have argued for the literal interpretation of 
61 NZMC 1• AC. above n I. 
62 See Principles for Croll'n Action. above n37. 
61 Cooke. above n58 , 3. 
64 See for example Chapman above. n57. 228 "'that modest. hasty, time bound. document of February 
1840." A rebuttal to Chapman·s position was given in P McHugh "Constitutional Myth and the 
Treaty of Waitangi .. [ 1991] NZLJ 316. 
65 James McGuire "A Theory for a More Coherent Approach to Eliciting the Meaning of the 
Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi .. ( 1996) NZLJ 116. 
66 Most importantly NZMC l' AC. above n I. which was a Court of Appeal decision concerning 
statutory interpretation and land rights. and Ne~r Zealand Maori Council 1• Attomey-Ceneral [ 1994] I 
NZLR 513 a Privy Council decision concerning broadcasting rights . 
67 NZMC v AC. above n I. 655-656 per Cooke P and 373 per Richardson J (NZMC) 
68 NZMC 1· AC. above n I, 373 per Richardson J. see also New Zealand Maori Council 1• Attorney-
Ceneral [ 1994] I NZLR 513, 517 where Woolf LJ in the Privy Council stated: "With the passage of 
time. the "principles" which underlie the Treaty have become much more important than its precise 
terms.·· 
69 Jane Kelsey, "Rogernomics and the Treaty: an irresolvable Contradiction" ( 1989) 7 Law in Context 
66, 85. 
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the Treaty to take precedence over any sort of principled approach "conveniently 
overlooks the fact that the Treaty is a written document ... not a mere matter of 
, · · , ,, 70 spmt. 
Indeed the mere idea of formalising the principles of the Treaty may seem to cement 
the interpretation of the Treaty on Crown terms. As the current principles have been 
developed by the government and the Crown Courts, the Crown would be in effect 
the arbitrator of an agreement it is a party to. 7 1 This would indicate that the approach 
as it stands right now is too lopsided to provide a useful basis of a framework for the 
future. 
If such is true, the place of the Treaty and the principled interpretative process at 
present is not suitable to provide a framework for a way forward that provides an 
acceptable solution to the contextual problems. 
A positive aspect of using a principled approach is the ease at which new and 
modern concepts can be developed while consistency is maintained. Unlike other 
methods, which rely heavily on an interpretation of the Treaty within linguistic or 
legal confines, a principled approach has few constraints and has the ability to look 
to providing for the future relationships of the parties. 
There would be a real danger that if a principled approach were adopted to elicit the 
meaning of the Treaty, that current judicial precedent that has been developed would 
play an over influencing part in formulating any new principles. The principles that 
have been developed by the Courts have been developed through specific limited 
jurisdictions handed to them by Parliament. The Waitangi Tribunal is a creature of 
statute and lives and dies, like any other statutory body, at the whim of its political 
masters. The Treaty jurisprudence of the High Court and Court of Appeal is also 
confined in that the Treaty will only apply to their consideration when specifically 
10 C hapmann. above n57. 23-l-. 
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referred to in legislation that is in issue. The Court is also usually only asked to look 
at Treaty issues within the legal and constitutional confines of a judicial review 
application. A principled discussion at a political level would not be so confined, but 
may be apt to influence by principles elicited in the confined atmosphere of the 
Courts. 
When talking about an approach to frame a discussion on what meanings to take 
from the Treaty, a principled approach would provide a full range of ideas to be 
discussed without undue restriction. However, this process may be influenced by the 
principles that have currently been elicited by the government and the Courts and 
there is a danger that discussions will start and end at that point. 
71 K Upston-Hooper ·'Slaying the Leviathan: Critical Jurisprudence and the Treaty of Waitangi'" 
(1998) 28 VUWLR 683. 685. 
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V METHODS OF GIVING TREATY FORMAL RECOGNITION 
This section looks at three methods of giving the Treaty a formal place in modern 
New Zealand. This involves finding a place for the principled interpretation which 
would be developed through discussion and input from all concerned groups on the 
goals set out in Part II. 
A New Deal 
Some have suggested that the Treaty should be done away with in favor of a new 
agreement or understanding, couched in terms acceptable to all parties and 
expressing a modern approach and framework for the future. 7~ 
In some ways this essay is arguing for just that, a step away from the literal words of 
the Treaty in favor of nationally negotiated principles. However, the principles that 
this essay espouses would be negotiated using the Treaty as the base and giving it a 
modern emphasis. Proponents of a pure "new deal" approach argue that the Treaty 
should be retired - be given an honorable discharge as having been satisfied and, 
therefore, no longer a relevant document to the needs of today's New Zealanders. In 
its place should be negotiated a fresh, modern understanding." n 
A "new deal" approach would have the advantage that any new agreement would be 
based upon a modern understanding of the Treaty relationship. Strictly speaking this 
approach would fulfil the goals of the essay in that the principles and goals could be 
embodied in a new document that would be agreeable to all parties. 
It is unlikely that moving away from the original document and the principles that it 
has been found to hold would be acceptable to Maori, as it is likely to be interpreted 
72 Richard Mulgan "Can the Treaty of Waitangi Provide a Constitutional Basis for New Zealand' s 
Political Future'" Political Science Vol. 41, No. 2. December 1989 51. 65 l"Can the Treaty of 
Waitangi Provide'"]. 
73 Can the Treaty of Waitangi Provide. above. n72. 65 (Quoting Ralph Maxwell). 
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as the Crown placing the Treaty obligations in the "too hard" basket, and negotiating 
an agreement that would more suit their governance structure and thus further 
marginalise Maori. Any replacement agreement to the Treaty would need to contain 
almost exactly the same terms in order for it to be acceptable to Maori. 
Further, any new agreement would need to find a place in New Zealand's 
constitutional framework, so the issue that faces the community now about the 
constitutional place of the Treaty would also apply to any new agreement. The time 
and resources that would be used in creating the new agreement would be better 
spent in finding a place for the Treaty that would provide for its principles. Thus, 
finding an answer to the issue through a new agreement only gets you so far and 
major issues would still need to be addressed. 
The Treaty, both as a symbol and as a set of concrete promises on which a national 
identity is founded, is too important and entrenched in New Zealand society to be set 
aside in this ·way. It is the central symbol of Maori identity within Aotearoa-New 
Zealand74 and is a document that was born in a spirit of goodwill, justice and fair 
play. It is a living document and that spirit lives with it. 75 Rather than being set aside 
and completely renegotiated, the Treaty, its principles and spirit, should be used as 
the basis of a continuing future relationship for New Zealand. 
Thus, as a method of g1vmg the Treaty formal, constitutional recognition , 
constructing a new agreement between the parties would go as far as looking at the 
goals set out in the essay and using the principles of the Treaty as a guide. However, 
the question of giving the Treaty formal recognition would still remains to be 
addressed. 
7
-1 Can the Treaty of Waitangi Provide. above. n72. 65-66. 
75 Geoffrey Palmer 'The Treaty of Waitangi - Principles for Crown Action" ( 1989) 19 VUWLR 335. 
344. 
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B Tangible 
A tangible recognition of the Treaty would provide the Treaty with formal 
recognition through a direct mean . Suggestions that have been made on how a 
tangible recognition of the Treaty could be made include developing a Maori 
parliament. Concrete recognition could also include what are termed "Treaty 
settlements" or the return of wrongfulJy taken land and resources. 
I A Maori Parliament 
A concrete recognition of the Treaty through the implementation of a Maori 
parliament would be much more direct than any abstract recognition and the nation 
would feel the effects of the change almost instantaneously. Concrete recognition 
through the development of a Maori legislature would give Maori an immediate 
constitutional position while maintaining the constitutional institutions needed to 
maintain the·concepts of Crown government. 
One suggested option was that "a body fifty percent elected by the Maori people and 
fifty percent elected by the remainder be established to sit between the parliament 
and the Governor-General to ensure proposed legislation is consistent with the 
Treaty of Waitangi."76 The idea of a bicameral parliament was, however. rejected by 
the Royal Commission on the Electoral System stating that "we believe that the re-
introduction of a satisfactory second Chamber would be very difficult to achieve"77 
The real problem with the development of a Maori legislature is the Jack of actual 
options for its achievement. Many questions would still be left unanswered, such as: 
Would there be a bicameral or unicameral legislature? How would member be 
elected? What powers would members have to ensure the Treaty principles and 
relationship is adhered to? What place would the Crown play given its symbolism? 
76 
Williams. above n 19. 15. 
77 
Royal Commission. above n I 0, 282 . 
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These are questions that are really only amenable to answer at a constitutional level. 
The processes and systems for determining how a newly constituted legislature 
would work would need to be determined before any new parliament could be 
formed. 
If there were to be found an acceptable proposal for a new parliament the question is 
would a tangible recognition mean that legislation, policy and precedent will be 
developed in line with the principles of the Treaty that such a body is designed to 
enshrine? The answer is of course unknown, but it is difficult to envision that a 
concrete provision without more would provide a positive answer to this question. 
It is much more likely that concrete provisions, such as a Maori legislature or 
Parliament would flow from an abstract provision for the Treaty than the other way 
around. Constitutional change to either the legislature or the electoral system in 
order to answer the questions posed by the Treaty issues would leave a lot of issues 
surrounding the Treaty still to be dealt with. 
2 A settlenient process 
Another possible tangible method of providing for the Treaty principles and Treaty 
relationships is through settlement of Maori claims for past breaches or non-
adherence to the Maori interests that the Treaty sought to protect. 
Numerous breaches of the Treaty by the Crown have been recorded 78 and the 
government focus has often been on full and final settlement of these grievances. 
The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to hear grievances under the Treaty, 
which (after a 1986 amendment) can stretch back to the time of the signing of the 
Treaty in 1840. The Tribunal has the power to recommend to government that 
78 See Claudia Orange ·The Treaty of Waitangi·· (Bridget Williams Books. Wellington. 1992). 
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certain lands be returned to Maori. 79 Further to this the Crown has actively 
negotiated and settled with Maori groups on a one-to-one basis. Outcomes of these 
have included the "Sealords ' deal" and settlements with the Ngai Tahu80 
A claims process is necessary in order to determine and make amends for tangible 
asset losses. Dealing with tangible Treaty claims also helps in achieving a sense of 
finality in one aspect of the Treaty relationship so that other aspects can be fostered 
without becoming tied up in asset disputes. 
The claims process seeks to return to Maori a resource base and rangatiratanga or 
Maori control over Maori resources. This re-resourcing would place Maori in a 
stronger position for the discussion on issues of re-empowerment and governance. It 
would also serve to create an air of goodwill between the Crown and Maori that 
could be followed through into any discussions regarding a further place for the 
Treaty relationship, such as constitutional provision and power sharing. 
The claims process would also go some way towards the goal of heightening Crown 
legitimacy. The Treaty provides for Maori to exercise governance over their own 
assets. By settling disputes surrounding the assets and relinquishing control over 
these resources to Maori, the Crown can be seen as actively redressing the issues in 
the Treaty and moving beyond the "lagging Treaty partner"81 image. 
One policy developed by the Crown was the ·'fiscal envelope'· proposed by the 
National government in 1994.82 This proposal would have seen full and final 
settlement of Maori Treaty grievances from a fund , capped at one billion dollars. 
79 Under section 4A(3)(a) of the Treaty or Waitangi Act 1975. the Tribunal cannot inquire into the 
return of private land. a provision that touched off the NZMC 1· AC case (above. n I) as the State 
Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was proposing to corporatise large tracks or Crown land which may put 
them out of reach or any Maori claims. 
8° Contained in the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 and the Ngai Tahu 
Claims Settlement Act 1998. 
81 NZMC 1• AC. above n I. 672 per Richardson J. 
82 Office or Treaty Settlements Cro1rn Proposals for 1he Seflle111e111 of Treaty of Waitangi Claims: 
De1ailed Proposals (Department of Justice. Wellington. 1994 ). 
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Objections were raised to this proposal, which highlight the problems associated 
with using settlements as a method of dealing with Treaty issues. As one writer has 
put it "There is a scant sense of the need to establish mechanisms for the on going 
relationship between Crown (the state) and Maori beyond the claims process."83 This 
seeming ignorance of the underlying issues of the Treaty has been taken a step 
further by another writer "This mechanism seeks to remove the threat to 
parliamentary supremacy by neutralizing Article Two of the Treaty,8-i effectively 
denying Maori any special constitutional status or recognition."85 
Certainly it seems that formal processes of redress are taking precedence over formal 
recognition of the rest of the principles of the Treaty. Tangible Treaty settlements by 
themselves could never hope to fulfill all of the principles of the Treaty, as true 
settlement requires recognition of the mana of the Maori people. A constitutional 
transformation is required to ensure the finality of settlement. 86 
Even in the proposing of the settlement the Crown has fallen down on other possible 
principles such as consultation with Maori. One commentator, describing Maori 
reaction to the proposed settlements has summarise: "Objection stemmed from the 
process adopted in developing the proposal, the principles upon which the proposal 
is based, the assumption made in justification, and the framework within which the 
proposal has been drafted. " 87 
This highlights an underlying nature of claims based settlement. As Paul McHugh 
has noted, Aboriginal peoples have no option but to express their claims in the 
language of the coloniser, and this in itself accentuates the vertical form relationship 
83 Sovereignty this Century. above n4 l. 205. 
8
~ See Appendix I and II. 
85 Nick Harris .. Full and Final Settlement of Treaty Grievances: the Crowns Hidden Constitutional 
Adgenda" ( 1996) 8 Auckland UL Review 205. 
86 Harris. above 1185. 206. 
87 Proceedings of a hui. above n7. 20. 
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between the state and the aboriginal peoples.
88 This can be seen in our own claims 
process through the limiting of the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal and its 
status as only a recommendatory body and through the imposition of European style 
management structures for dealing with the assets when they have been recovered, 
sometimes causing grave problems. 89 McHugh further goes on to state that this 
process invests the state with a redemptive capacity and gives the aboriginal people 
someone to blame.90 In perpetuating blame the settlements process can be seen to 
destroy the Treaty relationship rather than enhance it. 
The one-sided nature of the drafting and the formulating of the proposals has also 
lead to conflict within Maori on questions of how best to redistribute assets to a 
people who are in a vastly different position now then were when they were 
deprived of the assets. One commentator has written about the effects of the 
Sealords settlement, stating "This ·settlement' has since been the source of almost 
constant litigation, for the most part-Maori against Maori, as various iwi groups have 
been forced to compete with one another to secure a share of a commercial interest 
in the New Zealand fishery". 91 
A claims process is necessary. There are genuine tangible grievances that can only 
be worked through and dealt with through such processes. However, thi s in itself 
does not provide an appropriate place for the Treaty principles to be realised and 
relationship flourished. Indeed, if the claims process is all that is concentrated on at 
the expense of a background agreement on how the relationship between the 
claimant and the state is to operate, the process is unlikely to do more than cover the 
visible cracks in the relationship without addressing underlying fundamental issues. 
88 Ken Coates & P.G. McHugh Lii·ing Relationships (Vic toria University Press. Wellington. 1998) 
114 {"Lii•ing Re/a1io11ships ""]. 
89 Sec Mah111a 1· Porinw (9 November 2000) unreported . High Court. Hamilton Registry. M'.290/00. 
Hammond J. whuch was one in a series of cases that give an example where management structure:,, 
regarding Tainui'!"7'l Have been in great turmoil. 
90 Li1•i11g Re/a1io11ships. above 1188. I 1-L 
91 Annie Mikare ·'Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final. or Fatally Flawed?" NZULR v 17 
December 1997 425. 
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Tangible methods of dealing with the Treaty relationship and Treaty principles are 
necessary. They provide concrete recognition of the Treaty and engage all parties in 
open dialogue. However, tangible methods are quantitative rather than qualitative 
they are assessed more in the amounts of claims settled and assets returned than the 
satisfaction of the parties in the process. To have a successful claims process, it 
needs to be preceded by agreements as to how the relationship between the parties is 
to be addressed so qualitative solutions can be reached. 
C Abstract 
The word "abstract" is used to describe methods of formalising the Treaty that do 
not have a specific concrete outcome. The major one advocated in this essay is a 
constitutionalisation of the Treaty. This process would mean taking the Treaty 
principles that were developed and agreed upon, and providing for them in a 
document or place that makes them a basis for New Zealand's governance structure 
so that the principles of the Treaty would influence legislation, policy and precedent, 
rather than the flawed and inconsistent system that is currently in place. 
As discussed above in Part III there is an argument that the Treaty is already 
recognised as a constitutional document. Paul Havemann has stated that "since the 
1980's there has been a fundamental paradigm shift or revolution in official 
discourse amounting to a constitutionalisation of the Treaty ' s principles."92 
Constitutional law is concerned with the history, structure and functioning of central 
government? ' A constitution is something that includes all rules that directly or 
indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state .9-• 
New Zealand lacks an identifiable document or series of documents known as "the 
constitution", containing a selection of the most important laws about the state and 
92 What's in the Trearr. above n25. 73. 
91 Philip A. Joseph c;ns1it11tiona/ and Adminisrratil'e La11· in Nell' Zealand (The Law Book Company 
Ltd. Sydney. 1993) I ["Constitutional and Admi11isrra1ii•e Lwr in Ne1r Zealand"} . 
9
-1 A.V. Dicey .. The Law of the Constitution .. (1885) Part II. 
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its system of government.95 The Constitution Act 1986 does contain fundamental 
laws and institutions but can be altered in the ordinary way through simple 
parliamentary majority and many rule of the constitution are found outside this Act. 
Some may argue that Treaty jurisprudence has developed down a stream separate 
from one which may be apt for constitutionalisation and it is becoming too late to try 
to move the Treaty from its current position. 96 Legislative references. political 
principles and a settlement process are all dealing with the job and it is these that 
seem to be being developed. as opposed to constitutional provision. The Canadian 
position provides somewhat of an answer to this. Despite numerous treaties Canada 
first constitutionalised aboriginal rights in their Constitution Act 1982.97 
The way that the Treaty is written allows for important elements of what the 
constitution might address sovereignty, governance. government, community 
authority, ownership rights between the state and its citizen , citizenship rights and 
duties, and · so on.98 However, it is a big task to fulfil the goals set out; the 
constitution that would be developed would need to recognise the Treaty 
relationship principles based upon a bi-cultural partnership and a multicultural 
society. The constitution would need re-ordering to recognise the right of Maori 
once again to exercise their political self-determination.99 
Analysing this issue is not just a question of looking to the pre ent system and 
asking whether the current monocultural constitutional norms are compatible with a 
constitutionalisation of the Treaty. Positions of both Treaty pa11ners need to be 
looked at as both will necessarily be contributing to the overall makeup of the 
95 Constitwional and Administratil·e Lair in Ne1r Zealand. above n93. 9. 
96 Boast. above n 15. I 23. 
97 Section 35( I) of the Canadian Cinstitution Act 1982 states. "The existing aboriginal and treat) 
rights or the aboriginal peoples or Canada are hereby recogniLed and affirmed." 
98 NZLS Seminar. above n2. 27. 
99 Moana Jackson ··Justice and Political Power: Reasserting Maori Legal Process" in Kayleen 
Hazlehurst (ed) Legal Pluralism and the colonial legacr (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Aldershot. 1995) 
243. 257. 
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constitution. The current English based constitutional system cannot provide for the 
Treaty relationship alone and of itself. It would be a culturally smug and circular 
proposition to imply that the law itself will remain fair and equal simply because 
fairness and equality are enshrined as basic tenants. 100 This analysis will necessitate 
looking at two things: 
1. The compatibility of the Crown tenements of constitutional government with a 
constitutionalisation of the principles of the Treaty; and 
2. The compatibility of the guarantees made to Maori under the Treaty with a 
constitutionalisation of the principles of the Treaty. 
1 Principles of Crown constitutional government 
The tradition of constitutional thought which has been dominant in this country 
through most of this (20111 ) century has been a Westminster continuation adopted 
from the British settlers. Thus many of the principles of the constitution are 
developed directly from England without New Zealand developing a urnque 
constitutional approach. Some say that we have clung on too long to a British 
tradition that proved to be increasingly arid and not capable of sustaining the various 
aspirations exhibited by the many different sorts of people who live here. 101 
This would indicate from the outset that the constitutional principles that underpin 
our society at the moment would not be conducive or accepting to having Treaty 
principles affecting them. On the other hand, in an uncontrolled constitution such as 
ours, it would be perfectly easy to incorporate new norms into the constitutional 
structure. Indeed the status and standing of these particular constitutional rules may 
change over time naturally anyway. This would indicate that the Crown 
100 Jackson. above n99, 257. 
101 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our political system (Mclndoe, 
Dunedin. 1992) 77. 
constitutional norms may be amenable to being affected by a new set of principles 
based on the Treaty. 
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Change at a constitutional level such as the one envisaged in this essay has not been 
explored in New Zealand and the system remains almost identical to the one given to 
us by the English.
102 
As one commentator has said: "There remains, however, a no-
man 's land, in which constitutional principle yields no certain guidance. What limits 
should the constitution place upon the legislative discretion 's of a sovereign 
parliament?" 1 w 
In assessing whether a constitutionalisation of the principles of the Treaty would be 
amenable to the current constitutional processes in New Zealand, two concepts will 
be looked at: the concept of "parliamentary sovereignty" and the concept of "the 
Crown." 
(a) Parliamentary Supremacy 
Under the New Zealand constitutional system of governance Parliament has 
unlimited and unlimitable powers of legislation. io.i Parliament could enact, amend or 
repeal any of the principles of the Treaty. There would be no legal boundary in the 
current constitutional makeup to prevent this from occurring. 
If the principles of the Treaty were to be constitutionalised, or in other words 
become the basis for the power of governance, this would seem to clash directly 
with the idea of a sovereign parliament. Parliament 's supreme lawmaking power 
would be restrained by the Treaty principles. This section deals with whether having 
the principles of the Treaty, as a constraint on parliamentary sovereignty would be 
repugnant to that doctrine. 
102 Exceptions include the Ombudsmann and a different electoral system . but the main facets of 
constitutional crovernment remain the same. Crown, Parliament and the Judiciary. 
103 R.Q. Quentin-Baxter "Themes of Constitutional Development"" ( 1985) 15 YUWLR 12, 14. 
IQ.I Constitutional and Admi11isrrati1·e La11· in Ne11 · Zealand. above. 1194. -+ 18 . 
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Parliamentary supremacy is already somewhat bound by the constitutional laws and 
conventions necessary to keep the system running smoothly. Some rules are in the 
strict sense "laws as they are rules which are enforced by the Courts. 105 In New 
Zealand the Constitution Act 1986 contains the legal makeup of the government 
structure. Courts will enforce its provisions but it too is only a normal piece of 
legislation, as vulnerable as any other to repeal or amendment. If such a repeal or 
amendment was to occur, the Courts should rightly apply and enforce such an action 
as the will of Parliament. The other set of rules of constitutional government, the 
"conventions," are not written law and are not enforced by the courts, they consist of 
understandings, habits, or practices which are not really laws at alI. 106 The 
conventions are of binding authority only through their moral adherence for, as 
Dicey has said, if any or all of them were broken, no court would take notice of their 
violation. 107 
New Zealand is a sovereign state and is not bound by the powers of any other body 
or parliament. 108 Adherence to the system of government that we have therefore may 
be described as a "convention." Once as the state and its constitutional makeup is 
seen as a mental construct, a product of cerebral analysis which ees human relations 
in a particular way, 109 then the introduction of a basis for the nation's constitutional 
makeup such as the Treaty principles would not be seen as so repugnant to the 
current institutions. 
Some may argue that the structures of government are contained in the Constitution 
Act 1986 and are therefore legal rules rather than conventions. However, it needs to 
be taken a step further back. The New Zealand Parliament has supreme law making 
powers, and the place where this concept is derived from is an ordinary statute. This 
105 Dicey. above n94. 
106 Dicey. above n94. 
107 Dicey, above n94. 
108 The Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 gave the New Zealand Parliament unrestricted 
legislative power. 
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means that the New Zealand Parliament can repeal or amend the basis of its own 
power with impunity. The reason that Parliament does not do that sort of thing is that 
they feel morally bound not to. At this level such a bind on legislative action would 
be considered a convention. 
The constraint on acting contrary to the principles of the Treaty may be treated in the 
same way as the constraint on not abolishing the Parliament. The Constitution Act 
1986 states in s 14( l) "There shall be a Parliament of New Zealand." This can be 
amended or repealed and Parliament Dissolved without means of resurrection.
110 
But, the moral force that it holds is a constraint on the supremacy of Parliament. 
Such moral force could also attach to constitutional provision for the Treaty 
principles. 
Binding a supreme Parliament to enact its laws in a particular way does seem to go 
against the doctrine that the Parliament can pass any law that it likes. But, such a 
constraint is not repugnant to the idea of Parliamentary supremacy. If Treaty 
principles are seen as a fundamental constitutional provision and constraint on 
Parliament then they will be adhered to, like all of the other fundamental tenements 
of our system that have been enshrined in the Constitution Act 1986. 
(b) The Crown 
The Crown is the head of state and all government is carried out in its name. 
111 Bills 
become law only through the assent of the Crown, usually carried out through the 
Crown's representative, the Governor-General.
112 There is a convention, core to this 
system of governance, that the business of government is effectively carried out by 
Ministers of the Crown, who hold the confidence of Parliament. These Ministers 
109 JC Garnett .. Sovereignty and Power in a Changing World .. in GA Woog and LS Leyland Jr (eds) 
State and Sovereignty (University of Otago Press. 1997) 36. 38 . 
11° Constitutional and Administrative Law in Neu· Zealand, above n93. 483. 
111 Andrew Ladley "The head of State: The Crown. the Queen and the Governor-General" in 
Raymend Miller (ed) Neu· Zealand Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press. 1997) 51. 
112 The Governor-General is provided for in section 2 of the Constitution Act 1986. 
give "advice" to the Governor-Genera] on all sorts of things, such as the 
appointment of Judges and other key people, and legislation to be assented to. This 
advice is, by convention, binding on the Governor-General and he or she must 
exercise his or her legal powers according to the advice of Ministers. 113 Political 
power rests with the parliamentarians, not an unelected Queen's representative. 11 4 
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The sovereign power in effect rests with Parliament and, as discussed above, a 
constitutional place for the principles of the Treaty may not be repugnant to this 
concept. It seems, therefore, that the concept of the Crown may also be compatible 
with a constitutionalisation of the Treaty principles. The Governor-General in ew 
Zealand (and the Queen when she is here) performs three main sets of functions -
ceremonial, symbolic and constitutional. 115 It is in the exercise of these powers that 
the incompatibility with the idea of a constitutional place for the Treaty principles 
may lie. 
The first role of the Crown is a ceremonial one, some see the Governor-Genera]' s 
role as primarily a ceremonial and community affirming one. 11
6 Except for the 
symbolism that that may carry, which is discussed below, this role of the Governor-
General's could effectively be carried out within the principles of the Treaty. 
The second role of the Crown is symbolic. The Crown symbolises the head of state. 
The idea of Crown as the head of state and thus the necessity to have the Crown 
assent to all legislation, whether the actual power is fictional or not, would probably 
be inconsistent with the idea of the Treaty partnership which provides a basis for 
constitutionaJising the principles of the Treaty. 
If the Crown was to continue to hold the vital symbolic status of assenting to 
legislation, even bound by the constitutionalised principles of the Treaty , this would 
m B.V. Harris "The Constitutional Base" in Hyam Gold (ed) "New Zealand Politics in Perspective" 
(Longman Paul. Auckland. 1992) 56. 59. 
11 -1 Andrew Stockley "The Governor-General and MMP" ( 1996) NZLJ 213. 214. 
115 Bridled Power. above. n5. 41. 
still be symbolic of the Colonial power and only one of the Treaty partners. This 
symbolism also carries through to the international arena where New Zealand's 
identity on the world stage is symbolised through the Crown. 
40 
Under this argument there would need to be a symbolic change in the identity of the 
decision-making executive and the symbolism that it conveys to reflect the 
partnership aspects of the Treaty. To maintain the Crown as the symbolic head of 
state could be seen as a European based concept having the last say on the principle 
of the Treaty without also reflecting the Maori identity of New Zealand. 
The third concept of the Crown is the constitutional one. The Crown retains reserve 
powers so that in some cases the Governor-General is entitled to act on his or her 
own, not on the advice of responsible Ministers. 11 7 There are four generally accepted 
reserve powers under New Zealand's constitutional system; 11 8 
1. To appoint a Prime Minister 
2. To dismiss a Prime Minister 
3. To refuse to dissolve Parliament; and 
4. In limited circumstances, to force a dissolution. 
Added to this list of reserve powers could possibly be the ability to refuse the royal 
assent to legislation if it were repugnant to constitutional principles.
11 9 
Reserve powers are only used when there is a crisis of confidence in the Parliament 
such that it no longer has confidence in the Prime Minister of the government of the 
day. Some academics have gone further in the description of the extent of the 
reserve powers of the Crown stating that these reserve powers should be used in 
situations "where his or her minister_ seek to abuse their control of Parliament so as 
116 Stockley. above nl 14. 214. 
11 7 Bridled Poll'er. above. n5. 43. 
11 8 Bridled Poll'er. above. n5. 44. 
11 9 Stockley. above nl 14. 214. 
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to act unconstitutionally, or should some other crisis require intervention to protect 
the Constitution or the nation." ' 120 
The impact of a constitutionalisation of the Treaty would mean that the situations 
where the reserve powers of the Crown could be used would be defined by the 
principles of the Treaty. This may see a greater role for these reserve powers with 
the Governor-General perhaps having to refuse royal assent if a piece of legislation 
is in conflict with Treaty principles. 
In reality the reserve powers are seldom used and the use of them has been known to 
spell the end of that particular Governor-General's tenure. 121 But the fact remains 
that they are there in the constitutional makeup of the country and an introduction of 
a constitutionalised set of principles would necessarily change their foundation. 
This change may then mean that the reserve powers of the Crown have to be 
reviewed or removed, as the constitutionalisation of the Treaty principles would 
widen the scope of the reserve powers to include protection when Parliament acts 
contrary to the principles of the Treaty. Wider reserve powers would give the 
Governor-General an inflated role in the constitutional makeup of the country. The 
present structure seeks to limit the Crown· s powers, so this wider constitutional role 
for the Governor-General may be in conflict with the present system. 
The necessity for reserve powers was also raised when the country last shifted 
constitutional base in implementing MMP as the electoral system. Some 
commentators were calling for the removal of reserve power . One such 
commentator argued that "the most important reform is denying the Governor-
General any discretion in constitutional matters and relocating the appropriate 
powers in Parliament itself. This would leave the Governor-General constitutionally 
neutered, but freed from political controversy and better able to concentrate on 
120 Stockley. above n 114, 214. 
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representing the nation in a solely ceremonial and community affirming role." 122 
Similar arguments may crop up if constitutionalisation of the Treaty principles was 
to be contemplated. 
If the repugnance of the Treaty principles against the symbolism of the Crown and 
the argument against the reserve powers of the Crown are combined, this would 
seem to leave little room for the concept of the Crown itself. Such a situation would 
seem to teeter on the edge of republicanism. But, the issue is not whether New 
Zealand becomes a republic or remains a constitutional monarchy, but how the 
Crown-Maori relationship is to be resolved and evolved! 23 
The Crown did, at the very least, obtain the right to govern. 124 The concept of Crown 
then is also one of the principles of the Treaty and is a partner to the Treaty. To 
remove the symbolism and content of what is "Crown" from the constitutional 
structure of New Zealand may, in itself, be something that the constitutionalised 
principles of the Treaty would not allow. 
2 Maori principles of governance 
The analysis in this section is limited to the question of whether rangatiratanga 
guaranteed to Maori in Article II of the Treaty could flow from the 
constitutionalisation of the principles of the Treaty and how it would be embraced 
and constrained by such a constitutional move. 
The Treaty was based on an exchange of promises and trust. There was a promise by 
the Queen to protect the political and legal authority of Maori and their control over 
121 Sir John Kerr's dismissal as Governor-General of the Whitlam Labor government in Australia in 
1975 is an example. See Constitutional and Administratii·e Law in Nell' Zealand. above n93. 591-593. 
122 Stockley. above nl 14,217. 
123 Andrea Tunks ·'Mana Tiriti" in Luke Trainor (ed) Republicanism in NeH· Zealand (Dunmore Press. 
1996) 113. 122. 
12
~ Te Mana. above n42. 3. 
natural resources, land and other taonga. 125 Any constitutional provision for the 
Treaty would need to be compatible with these ideas. 
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A warning needs to be sounded against trying to define these promises using the 
language of the Crown. As Williams has argued: "When a legal system, which has 
historically operated in a monocultural manner, takes steps toward legal pluralism, 
there is a distinct danger that the meaning and values attached to Maori concepts, 
when used in an iwi or hapu context, will be distorted and amenable to manipulation 
by others when they are used in the official discourse of the state legal system." 126 
With this warning heeded, the concepts that need to be explored center around the 
promise of tino rangatiratanga. McHugh describes tino rangatiratanga as something 
akin to the common law idea of imperium or sovereign title, rather than the 
dominion that the claims process redresses the wrongs through. 127 lmperium resides 
in the Crown but, as discussed above, the constitutionalisation of the principles of 
the Treaty will necessarily limit the powers of the Crown and increase the scope for 
Maori partnership in the concept of Crown and this in the imperium and governance 
over the land and other possessions that the Crown now holds as Maori would be 
more involved at the governance level both in symbolic ownership and actual 
control over resources 
Tino rangatiratanga is understood by many to essentially mean the right to self-
determination. Self determination is in turn described as being about the 
advancement of the Maori people as Maori.
128 However, the term has been further 
defined to mean self-management rather than self-determination, as self-
determination has connotations in the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
. 179 
Peoples of dissent from co10111al rule. -
125 Tunks. above n 123. 114-115. 
126 Williams. above n 19. 36. 
127 Sovereignty this Century , above n41. 205 . 
128 Te Mana. above n42. 4. 
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Whatever label is placed on this concept, there are three fundamental principles of 
tino rangatiratanga: 130 
1. Nga Matatini - Maori diversity: ... Maori live rn a diversity of everyday 
realities 
2. Whakakotahi - Maori unity: the potential for Maori solidarity based on a 
shared sense of belonging and a common destiny. 
3. Mana motuhake Maori - Maori autonomy and control: Maori should be able 
to determine their own futures, control their own resources , and develop 
their own political structure 
These principles would seem at first sight to clash with the idea of a 
constitutionalised set of Treaty principles, especially if the idea of Maori self 
determination was to be curtailed by the sharing of the control of Maori resources 
with the Crown, and the possible influence of Crown governance structures over the 
ability for advancement of the Maori people and their resources in a Maori way. 
However, while imperium or ultimate sovereignty over the land would be held at a 
state level Maori would have a much greater say in the exercise of any sovereign 
rights over the land and the implementation of any policy of legislation that would 
affect the land. Indeed the constitutional base for government, the principles of the 
Treaty. may dictate that Maori have full control over the destiny of this land. 
The idea that straight out imperium, or independent license to form self government 
over the lands be the domain of Maori, may be outside the scope of the principles of 
the Treaty and may also be impractical. McHugh has stated that the processes of 
self governance are more likely to require state facilitation than to exclude its 
involvement, providing the example of the United States where virtually all of the 
129 Te Mana. above n42, 220. 
130 M.H. Durie .. Tino Rangatiratanga: a disc us ion paper .. in "Report for the Congress Executive. 13 
May 1995. Maori Congress, Wellington. cited in Bridled Poll'er. above n5. 44. 
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tribes govern themselves under mechanisms established by the state, as back up for 
this proposition. 131 
At the dominion, or actual ownership control of the resources level, Maori 
governance may, as it is now, be curtailed by the state. There would be self 
government as a delegation from the state, with its scope defined by the state. 
132 But, 
as the state would be defined by its constitution and the constitution would include 
the principles of the Treaty, the trickle down effect would be that the delegation and 
scope of this self-management structure would itself be defined by the Treaty 
principles. 
Thus it can be seen that the principles of tino rangatiratanga may be compatible with 
underlying constitutional provision provided to the principles of the Treaty. There 
would be greater Maori control and Maori principles behind the imperium title in the 
land and greater Maori control over the real self-management of the resources at the 
dominion leyel. 
Discussing both Crown and Maori tenements of governance enshrined in the Treaty 
relationship and how they would hold up under a constitutionalisation of the 
principles of the Treaty is an attempt to move away from criticism leveled at Pakeha 
academics of framing the whole discussion of Maori rights within a pluralistic 
jurisprudence of the wairua or spirit that is consistent with their law.
133 To 
constitutionalise the Treaty relationship and principles is to put it at the top of the 
legal structure. If this is to effectively provide for the Treaty relationship then this 
will need to provide for both the Crown governance structure and a structure of tino 
rangatiratanga. 
131 Li1,ing Relationships. above n88. 121. 
132 Living Relationships. above n88. 121. 
133 Jackson, above n99. 252 . 
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VI ENTRENCHMENT OF THE TREATY 
As there is currently a doctrine that Parliament is the supreme lawmaking power, 
this section assumes that the method of providing for a constitutional place for 
Treaty principles will be through an Act of Parliament. The analysis then will 
concentrate on whether this Act needs to be, or even can be, entrenched. 
Entrenchment essentially means that future Parliaments will be bound by the 
provisions of the Act and provides special procedures for the amendment of the 
Act. 134 Prima face this is repugnant to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty. As one 
commentator has noted: "It is a maxim of the modern constitution, often acted upon 
by the courts, that a sovereign Parliament can in law do anything except bind its 
successors - for, if it could do that, succeeding Parliaments would have lost their 
· ,, I 3S sovereignty. · · 
One way that entrenchment can occur is through '·manner and form·· entrenchment, 
where the Act spells out the process for its own amendment. An example of this 
would be an Act requiring a 75 % majority in Parliament to amend its provisions. 
An example that is often used is section 189(2) of the Electoral Act 1956 which 
states that particular sections in the Act may only be changed with a 75 per cent 
majority in Parliament or a majority of electors in a referendum. A similar provision 
could be enacted to protect the constitutionalised principles of the Treaty. However, 
care would need to be taken as while section 189(2) effectively entrenches other 
sections in the Electoral Act 1956, section 189 itself is vulnerable to repeal in the 
ordinary way. If the Parliament were to be bound to particular manner and form 
requirements to amend the Treaty principles then they would need to be "double 
entrenched." Double entrenchment involves enacting provisions providing for the 
manner and form of amending the section which provides the manner and form for 
13-1 Constitutional and Administrati1•e Lall' in Nell' Zealand. above n93. 11 . 
135 Quentin-Baxter, above nl03. 18 . 
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amending it. The two sections would effectively cancel each other out and thus, 
theoretically, bind Parliament. 
However, as Joseph has noted "attempts at reconciling entrenchment and legislative 
supremacy obscure the critical is ue: whether the courts would be prepared to 
recognise a limited constitutional authority to legislate." m The White Paper on the 
Bill of Rights seriously doubted that the courts would uphold an entrenched Bill of 
Rights enacted by a simple majority in Parliament. rn 
Single entrenchment would mean that the principles of the Treaty would still be 
vulnerable to change by Parliament. But if Parliament was constituted partly on the 
authority of the principles then Parliament, while not legally bound, may feel 
morally bound to not repeal or amend them, or follow an enacted, but unentrenched 
manner and form in amending them. 
The argume.nt that Parliament could be morally bound to follow manner and form 
could gain credence from the fact that the Constitution Act 1986, carrying all of the 
processes of constitutional government is unentrenched. The vulnerability of the 
processes of constitutional government to amendment or repeal by simple majority 
has not stopped the nation functioning effectively. The constitutional conventions 
and principles that remain unwritten , and those that are given only legislative 
recognition are upheld and adhered to by the Courts and Parliament. 
Having a provision for the principles of the Treaty would mean that while the statute 
was enacted all action would be bound to follow its provisions. However, it would 
also mean that following the manner and form prescribed in the Statute that is not 
itself protected or entrenched would be of binding moral force only, and it comes 
back to the question above of whether the Courts would accept such moral force as 
binding. 
136 Constirutiona/ and Administratil'e Lall' in Ne11 · Zealand. above 1193. 483-484. 
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Philip Joseph has argued that it is possible that the Courts would see such a process 
as binding, talking about section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956, a provision similar 
to the one envisaged for the protection of the principles of the Treaty in this essay. 
Joseph has stated "Section 189 was enacted by a unanimous vote of Parliament in 
1956 and successive Governments have accepted its binding force. This presages the 
conventional force of entrenchment and the possibility that a binding constitutional 
convention may "crystallise" into a justiciable rule of law." 138 Under this analysis, if 
Parliament were to provide for the principles of the Treaty that would eventuate 
from a national debate envisaged in Part II and successive governments accept their 
binding force, then the Courts may treat Parliament as being bound by any manner 
and form requirements. 
This may raise again the problem that Palmer has with the judicial enforcement of 
Treaty principles, 139 that it is not the Court's role to be assessing the legal effect of 
the Treaty principles, as they are not well suited to balancing the interests of the 
Treaty. 140 Provision for the Treaty in a constitutional document would go some way 
toward answering those problems. Dealing with the competing interests under the 
Treaty would become the Court's role. The Courts would not be creating the 
principles themselves, as that would be done at the national level. The Courts would 
merely be interpreting and applying them, and would not be deciding broad policy 
issues. The Courts are also used to dealing with issues at the constitutional level, and 
it is their legitimate place to be the ultimate arbitrator in constitutional matters. i.ii 
The Courts in other common law countries have accepted changing constitutional 
circumstances as a constraint on parliamentary supremacy. The House of Lords in 
137 Draft White Paper A Bill of Rights For Ne1r Zealand (Department of Justice. 1985) 7.19 ["A Bill 
of Rights for Ne11• Zea/a11d"j . 
138 P.A. Joseph "Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum .. ( 1994) 16 NZULR 67. 76. 
139 Palmer. above n 16, 212. 
140 Palmer, above n 16. 212. 
141 Cases such as Fit-;,gerald v Muldoon [ 1976] 2 NZLR 615 indicate that the Court is willing to 
uphold constitutional doctrines. 
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the Factortame case 
142 
granted an injunction to forbid a Minister from following an 
Act of the English Parliament that was in contradiction to the European 
Communities Act 1972 (UK). 143 This same analysis could apply in New Zealand if 
the principles of the Treaty were given legislative effect in some sort of 
constitutional legislation. 
Court jurisprudence provides insight into how an unentrenched, constitutional, 
provision would be. In its jurisprudence relating to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, an unentrenched but constitutionally important statute, the Court of 
Appeal has demonstrated the importance of unentrenched provisions both m 
construing statutes and developing the common law. 144 Thus a constitutionally 
important unentrenched provision relating to the Treaty is likely to be afforded a 
special status by the Courts. 
Some have suggested that a logical legislative place for the Treaty would be within 
the bounds of the Constitution Act 1986. Denise Henare has stated that ·'Further 
strengthening of the constitutional protection of the Treaty could be achieved by a 
proposal to set out both texts of the Treaty in the preamble (to the Constitution Act 
1986). This would have the effect of giving acknowledgement to the origins of New 
Zealand, which in turn would enable future building of the nation.'' 
145 
A Treaty provision would not be the same as the other parts of the Constitution Act. 
The current provisions of the Constitution Act are merely descriptive of the 
constitutional world as it is and has always been. Other legislation does not 
challenge the Constitution Act, but is born of the very process that is described in the 
Act. A Treaty provision as advanced in this essay would be a different creature and 
would necessarily come into conflict with other legislation. New Zealand could not 
operate in the constitutionally same way as it has in the past without the provisions 
142 R v Secretary of State for Transport, exp. Factorrame Ltd ( No. 2) [ 1991 l AC 603. 
143 B.V. Harris ·'Parliamentary Sovereignty and Interim Injunctions : Factorta111e and New Zealand" 
(1992) 15 NZULR 55. 
144 NZLS Seminar, above n2. 11 . 
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contained in the Constitution Act, but it can, and has operated without the Treaty 
being an institution of government. 
It would seem that the Treaty principles in an acceptable form would, perhaps, find 
their best position in a statute that provides for the manner and form of the 
amendment of the Treaty principles but with that section not being entrenched itself. 
VII THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
For the constitutional status of the Treaty to be properly looked at and changed, the 
economic, social, cultural and political environment would need to be favorable. 
146 
Rhetoric on the need to make the most of ourselves, and of the awakened Maori 
consciousness with its eloquent plea for recognition, respect and partnership 
147 
is all 
very well , but it is of no consequence if the national environment rejects such a 
proposition. 
The move since the mid-1980 ' s to a privatised economy with government 
intervention at a minimum, has helped to highlight the remaining institutional 
functions of government, subjecting them to closer scrutiny by society. This closer 
scrutiny has lead to constitutional change, evidenced through the change in the 
electoral system from a First Past the Post to a Mixed Member Proportional system, 
more representative of the community. 
Margaret Wilson is more pessimistic about the chances of constitutional reform on 
the status of the Treaty, stating: "although conditions within the Maori community 
and the community at large would appear to be conducive to constitutional change, 
1~5 Henare, above n 12. 209. 
1~6 M Wilson "A Path to Constitutional Change·· in KS Coates and PG McHugh Lil'ing 
Relationships: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (V ictoria University Press, Wellington . 
1998), 247. 249 
1~7 Quentin-Baxter. above. n I 03, 13. 
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New Zealanders have traditionally been reluctant to undertake constitutional 
reform." 148 
Unfortunately history and the research that is available on the national attitude 
towards the Treaty, also doesn't bode well for acceptance and possible 
constitutionalisation of the Treaty. 
The Treaty has previously been the subject of an aborted attempt at 
constitutionalisation. In 1985 the White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand 
149 
proposed the incorporation of the Treaty into an entrenched Bill of Rights based on 
section 35 of the Canadian constitution Act 1982. 150 Both the Treaty clause and the 
proposed entrenchment of the Bill of Rights were eventually dropped from the final 
version of the Act. 151 Some say due to Maori who were suspicious of the 
government's motivation, or who asserted that the Treaty did not need entrenching 
and to do so would demean it. 152 However other academics were also critical of the 
inclusion of the Treaty in a Bill of Rights stating that, it should not be subject to the 
same processes of repeal as other provisions in the Bill 1
53 and that the proposal wa 
unacceptable as it was not subordinate to the Treaty .
154 
There is also statistical evidence that points away from the acceptance of a 
constitutionalised Treaty. In a survey conducted by Paul Perry and Alan Webster, 
results offer evidence of declining support for the Treaty and the Waitangi Tribunal 
that they saw as a major point of division within the country.
155 
In this survey 34% 
of respondents wanted the Treaty abolished, 29% saw a need for greater limits on 
148 Wilson. above n 146, 254. 
149 A Bill of Rights For New Zealand , above n 137. 
150 See above. n97 for the text of section 35( I) of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982. 
151 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
152 What is the Trearr. above n25. 89. 
153 F.M. Brookfeild ;,Submission on a Bill of Rights For New Zealand a White Paper 1985'' 4. 
154 J Kelsey in "Submission on a Bill of Rights For New Zealand a White Paper 1985" 4. 
155 Perry and Webster. above n4, 74. 
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Maori claims under the Treaty and only 5% thought that the Treaty should be 
strengthened and given the full force of law! 56 
This indicates that the national environment 1s probably not conducive to 
constitutionalising the Treaty. The reasons for this may be due to the ignorance of 
the population (especially the Pakeha population) on issues surrounding the Treaty. 
"There is material difference in the values and perceptions of Maori from those of 
European New Zealanders; that the basis of our presence here is the provision of a 
full and fair role for Maori and Maori values throughout the community." 157 Perhaps 
if the community is better informed of the issues surrounding the Treaty through 
national debate and commitment to a solution, attitudes towards its constitutional 
status may change. But, constitutional change in New Zealand, incorporating the 
Treaty, will be need to be a strategic, negotiated process between Maori, the Crown 
d h · · l 158 an t e commumty rn genera . · 
156 Perry and Webster. above n4. 
157 NZLS Seminar. above n2. 11. 
158 Wilson, above n 146. 256. 
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XIII CONCLUSION 
In order for the relationship between Maori and the Crown to progress past the 
embryo stage, aspects of the relationship that were enshrined within the Treaty will 
need to be given some formal recognition. Including Treaty principles within a 
constitution appears to be a viable option for maintaining a framework for future 
relationships and national decision making, replacing the inconsistent adherence to 
inconsistent Treaty principles that currently occurs in the Legislature and the Courts. 
This change in the constitutional structure would need to be preceded by the 
development of principles of the Treaty at a national level to give the process the 
legitimacy that it needs. Unfortunately, history and the current available indicators 
show that the national environment is not conducive to such debate or change. This 
may mean that the next great step in Treaty relations, a move beyond the embryo, 
may be some time off yet. 
LAW UBRARr 
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APPENDIX I - THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
Her Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
regarding with Her Royal Favor the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and 
anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment 
of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great 
number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the 
rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in 
progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the 
Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's sovereign authority 
over the whole or any part of those islands - Her Majesty therefore being desirous to 
establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil 
consequences which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and 
Institutions alike to the native population and to Her subjects has been graciously 
pleased to empower and to authorize me William Hobson a Captain in Her Majesty's 
Royal Navy Consul and Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may 
be or hereafter shall be ceded to Her Majesty to invite the confederated and 
independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following Articles and 
Conditions. 
Article the first 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the 
Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without 
reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or 
Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or 
to possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereign thereof. 
Article the second 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes 
of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries 
and other Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to 
alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and 
persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. 
Article the third 
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of 
New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges 
of British Subjects. 
[signed] W. Hobson Lieutenant Governor 
APPENDIX II - AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MAORI 
VERSION OF THE TREATY 
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Victoria, the Queen of England, in her gracious remembrance of the Chiefs and 
Tribes of New Zealand, and through her desire to preserve to them their 
chieftainship and their land, and to preserve peace and quietness to them, has 
thought it right to send them a gentleman to be her representative to the natives of 
New Zealand. Let the native Chiefs in all parts of the land and in the islands consent 
to the Queen's Government. Now, because there are numbers of the people living in 
this land, and more will be coming, the Queen wishes to appoint a Government, that 
there may be no cause for strife between the Natives and the Pakeha, who are now 
without law: It has therefore pleased the Queen to appoint me, WILLIAM 
HOBSON, a Captain in the Royal Navy, Governor of all parts of New Zealand 
which shall be ceded now and at a future period to the Queen. She offers to the 
Chiefs of the Assembly of the Tribes of New Zealand and to the other Chiefs, the 
following laws:-
I. The Chiefs of (i.e. constituting) the Assembly, and all the Chiefs who are absent 
from the Assembly, shall cede to the Queen of England for ever the government of 
all their lands. 
II. The Queen of England acknowledges and guarantees to the Chiefs, the Tribes , 
and all the people of New Zealand, the entire supremacy of their lands, of their 
settlements, and of all their personal property. But the Chiefs of the Assembly, and 
all other Chiefs , make over to the Queen the purchasing of such lands , which the 
man who possesses the land is willing to sell , according to prices agreed upon by 
him, and the purchaser appointed by the Queen to purchase for her. 
III. In return for their acknowledging the Government of the Queen, the Queen of 
England will protect all the natives of New Zealand, and will allow them the same 
rights as the people of England 
(Signed) WILLIAM HOBSON 
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